This is the third lesson of the macro topic, “Concepts and Categories to Understand the EU and Its Development and Working,” in the first module of EUPress Teacher Training.
The objective of this lesson, led by Pietro Sala, is to discuss intergovernmentalism.
European integration has often been framed as a story of institutions gaining power over nation-states. Yet one school of thought insists that, despite decades of shared policies and a common currency, national governments remain the decisive actors in the European Union. This approach — known as intergovernmentalism — offers a counterpoint to federalist or neo-functionalist theories and remains influential in explaining how the EU works today.
From realism to liberal intergovernmentalism
Intergovernmentalism evolved from the earlier realist view that states, motivated by power and security, dominate international affairs. But one key realist claim fell over time: that states always seek to maximize their power.
Enter Andrew Moravcsik, architect of liberal intergovernmentalism in the 1990s. Unlike realists, Moravcsik didn’t view states as monolithic actors driven solely by high politics or military concerns. Instead, he saw their behaviour in the EU as shaped primarily by domestic economic interests.
His theory rests on three analytical stages:
- National preference formation – where governments define positions based on domestic economic and political interests.
- Interstate negotiation – where states bargain to reach agreements, depending on relative power and preferences.
- Institutional choice – where states decide whether to implement agreements through intergovernmental cooperation or stronger supranational bodies.
Economic logic, not geopolitical strategy
Moravcsik rejects the idea that EU integration can be explained by geostrategic motives. He argues instead that most integration decisions reflect sector-by-sector economic reasoning: what benefits a country’s firms, industries, and trade.
Under this view:
- State preferences vary by economic sector (e.g., agriculture, energy, finance)
- Ministries of economy or trade unions may influence positions as much as foreign affairs departments
- There is no clear hierarchy where high politics (security, defence) always dominates low politics (economics, regulation)
Empirical method — and its limits
Moravcsik’s method is rationalist and binary: he looks at competing explanations (e.g., geopolitics vs. economics) and validates them through case studies. If one explanation fits better, the other is rejected.
Critics argue that this method oversimplifies political reality. By discarding the idea that multiple causes can shape a policy outcome, liberal intergovernmentalism risks overlooking the complex mix of pressures — institutional, ideological, electoral — that governments face in practice.
Does the theory still hold?
Liberal intergovernmentalism remains the dominant theory used by scholars to explain landmark EU deals — from the Single European Act to the Maastricht Treaty, or the creation of the Eurozone.
Yet recent crises — from the 2008 financial shock to the Covid-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine — have brought to the surface the limits of relying solely on national governments and interstate bargaining. The growing role of supranational bodies, particularly the European Central Bank, suggests that even in a world of powerful states, technocratic institutions can gain long-term autonomy.
Still, the core insight of intergovernmentalism remains: when it comes to defining integration’s direction, member states — and especially the biggest ones — remain in charge, negotiating based on national interest rather than any automatic march toward unity.
