The transformation of the international geopolitical order, which has intensified in recent years, is forcing Europe to fundamentally reassess its relationship with Africa, and particularly with the countries on its northern flank. North Africa is not merely the European Union’s southern border, but a strategic space where energy security, migration, great-power competition, terrorism and political stability in the Mediterranean converge. Since the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, however, European attention has been focused primarily on its eastern flank.
This relative decline in attention is particularly paradoxical given that the war in Ukraine has increased, rather than diminished, the geopolitical importance of North Africa. Europe’s efforts to reduce its dependence on Russian hydrocarbons have heightened interest in gas supplies from Algeria and Libya, Egypt’s energy and logistical capabilities, and the renewable energy potential of Morocco and Tunisia. There is also scope to develop corridors linking the two shores of the Mediterranean for renewable electricity, green hydrogen and low-carbon fuels. As Cardinale (2023) and Longa and van der Zwaan (2024) argue, such infrastructure could simultaneously help diversify Europe’s energy supply and support the industrialisation of North African countries.
However, energy relations should not be reduced to simply finding alternative suppliers. If Europe focuses solely on securing new sources of gas, electricity or minerals, it risks creating new forms of dependence in place of those it seeks to overcome. A balanced partnership should create value on both sides of the Mediterranean through productive investment, technology transfer, human capital development, local employment and the development of shared industrial value chains. Otherwise, Europe’s green transition could come to be seen as another form of resource extraction, with Africa bearing the territorial and environmental costs while Europe captures most of the technological and industrial benefits.
Energy relations are also shaped by the political tensions within the Maghreb. The rivalry between Morocco and Algeria remains one of the main barriers to regional integration. Their disputes over Western Sahara, the closure of the land border and the suspension of several channels of cooperation have implications not only for trade, but also for regional security, energy infrastructure and efforts to combat organised crime. The dispute between the two countries has also acquired an energy and diplomatic dimension with direct implications for Spain and the European Union as a whole. The Medgaz pipeline linking Algeria to the coast of Almería remains operational, while the Maghreb-Europe pipeline has been shut down because it crosses Moroccan territory. Europe’s efforts to diversify its energy supplies may therefore reduce some vulnerabilities while creating new ones if dependence becomes concentrated on particular countries or transport routes. Moreover, the risk of political and military instability, together with Morocco’s foreign policy, could give rise to a “southern flank” that is of particular relevance to Spain.
Libya represents a second major source of instability. More than a decade after the fall of Muammar Gaddafi, the country remains marked by institutional fragmentation, competing authorities, the presence of militias and the involvement of external actors. Its sovereignty remains contested and its political reconstruction incomplete. Libya has significant hydrocarbon reserves, but its importance extends well beyond the energy sector. Its position in the central Mediterranean makes it a critical territory for migration routes, illicit trafficking and the regional projection of foreign powers. The weakness of the state allows local factions, smuggling networks and international actors to operate with a degree of freedom that would be difficult to achieve within a consolidated institutional framework.
The Libyan crisis is closely connected to the growing political and security challenges in the Sahel. Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger have experienced military coups, institutional deterioration and a progressive distancing from France, the European Union and African regional organisations. At the same time, groups linked to Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State have demonstrated a remarkable ability to adapt to local conditions and exploit power vacuums. Jihadist terrorism cannot be understood solely as a religious or military phenomenon. It is also fuelled by weak institutions, communal conflicts, poverty, territorial exclusion, youth unemployment, illicit trafficking and the lack of public services.
Stability requires legitimate institutions, effective administrations, education, employment opportunities and a state presence in peripheral areas. The failure of several Western intervention models has also strengthened anti-European narratives that other powers, including China and Russia, have been able to exploit. Europe needs to combine security, diplomacy and development, avoiding both strategic disengagement and a return to paternalistic approaches. It also needs a more stable and developing North Africa capable of absorbing some of the future migration pressures generated by a growing population.
Demographic trends further highlight Africa’s growing strategic importance for Europe. According to the United Nations (2024), Africa’s population is projected to increase from approximately 1.5 billion in 2024 to around 2.5 billion by 2050, meaning that roughly one in four people in the world will live in Africa by then. Population growth will be particularly pronounced in parts of North Africa and the Sahel. Egypt’s population is expected to grow from around 117 million in 2024 to approximately 162 million by 2050, while Niger, given its high fertility rate and young population structure, could approach 50 million inhabitants by mid-century. Nigeria offers an especially striking example: its population, estimated at around 232 million in 2024, could reach approximately 310 million by 2040. In the Maghreb (Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Libya and Mauritania), the population is expected to rise from the current 111 million to 129 million by 2040, an increase of nearly 16% in just fifteen years. These trends will further widen the gap between an ageing Europe, where the working-age population is expected to stagnate or decline, and Africa’s young and rapidly growing populations. This growth could translate into a significant demographic dividend if accompanied by investment in education, job creation, industrialisation and stronger institutions. Without such conditions, however, it will place increasing pressure on labour markets, cities, education and healthcare systems, water and food supplies, and migration flows. Demographic growth should therefore not be seen as a threat in itself, but rather as a strategic factor whose effects will depend on the ability of African states and Euro-African cooperation to turn population growth into economic development, stability and opportunities.
European migration policy has increasingly relied on externalising part of migration management through economic agreements with governments in the region. While this approach may temporarily reduce certain migration routes, it can also facilitate the political instrumentalisation of migration and raise significant human rights concerns. Moreover, it does little to address the structural factors driving migration, including a lack of opportunities, demographic growth, conflict, environmental degradation and food insecurity.
A lasting partnership requires moving beyond a purely defensive approach. Europe is ageing and facing labour shortages in a number of sectors, while Africa has a large and growing young population with strong aspirations for greater prosperity. Regulated migration can benefit both regions if it is accompanied by legal pathways, training, recognition of qualifications, circular migration and cooperation against criminal networks. Viewing all African migration as a threat overlooks its potential economic and human benefits.
As for the presence of external powers, Russia has taken advantage of the vacuum left by Europe in the region through a combination of military cooperation, arms sales, support for governments and factions, disinformation campaigns, and the involvement of structures linked to the former Wagner Group and the organisation now known as the Africa Corps. Its strategy relies less on large-scale economic projects than on relatively low-cost political and military instruments. These mechanisms allow Moscow to offer protection to vulnerable governments, gain access to resources and secure strategic positions from which to project influence towards Europe. Recent literature identifies Libya, Algeria and Egypt, as well as several Sahel countries, as relevant nodes in this policy, although it does not support the existence of uniform Russian dominance across the region (Bamidele & Erameh, 2025).
China’s presence, by contrast, follows a different logic. Beijing has expanded its influence through trade, investment, infrastructure, telecommunications, and the construction and financing of projects linked to the “Belt and Road Initiative” (BRI), also known as the New Silk Road. Launched by China in 2013, the BRI is a major international strategy aimed at financing and developing infrastructure, transport, energy, trade and digital connectivity across Asia, Africa, Europe and Latin America, while also strengthening China’s economic and geopolitical influence. Algeria occupies a prominent position in this strategy, but Chinese business activity also extends to Egypt, Morocco and other African countries. China offers financial resources, rapid project implementation and relationships that are less constrained by political conditions than those established by Europe. However, its growing presence does not necessarily amount to uncontested hegemony. North African governments retain significant room for manoeuvre and make use of the competition between China, Russia, Europe, the United States and the Gulf powers to expand their room for strategic autonomy (Aluf, 2024; Gouasmia, 2025).
Decades after the end of colonialism, Europe must move beyond both paternalism and indifference. Africa can no longer be treated simply as a source of resources, a recipient of aid or a buffer against risks before they reach European borders. Nor should the dependencies of the colonial past be replaced by new forms of commercial dependence on other powers.
In an multipolar world, Europe’s relative economic, demographic and technological weight is declining. Its influence will increasingly depend on the quality of its partnerships. Euro-African relations should be based on reciprocity, productive investment, local value creation, shared security and respect for African priorities. Europe can and must focus on its eastern flank, but it cannot afford to overlook the South. Its security, energy supplies and much of its future prosperity will also depend on developments in North Africa.
References
Aluf, D. (2024). Mirage of coercion: The real sources of China’s influence in the Middle East and North Africa. Survival, 66, 159–182. https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2024.2403227
Bamidele, S., & Erameh, N. (2025). Moscow’s African relations: Unveiling Russia’s strategy in Africa and its impact on global politics. Security and Defence Quarterly. https://doi.org/10.35467/sdq/206969
Cardinale, R. (2023). From natural gas to green hydrogen: Developing and repurposing transnational energy infrastructure connecting North Africa to Europe. Energy Policy, 181, 113623. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2023.113623
Gouasmia, S. (2025). China in North Africa: The Algerian pivot. China Quarterly of International Strategic Studies. https://doi.org/10.1142/S2377740025500186
Longa, D. F., & van der Zwaan, B. (2024). Autarky penalty versus system cost effects for Europe of large-scale renewable energy imports from North Africa. Energy Strategy Reviews, 51, 101289. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.esr.2023.101289
United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. (2024). World population prospects 2024: Summary of results (UN DESA/POP/2024/TR/NO. 9). United Nations. chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://population.un.org/wpp/assets/Files/WPP2024_Summary-of-Results.pdf
Ricardo Palomo-Zurdo is Professor of Financial Economics, CEU San Pablo, Madrid
